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Abstract
As the lowcost options for radio traffic capture, analysis and transmission are becoming available,
somesecurityresearchershavedevelopedopensourcetoolsthatpotentiallymakeiteasiertoassess
the security of the devices that rely on radio communications without the need for extensive
knowledgeandunderstandingoftheassociatedconcepts.Recentresearchinthisareasuggeststhat
primitivevisualanalysistechniquesmaybeappliedtodecodeselectedradiosignalssuccessfully.This
study builds upon the previous research in the area of subGHz radio communications and aims to
outlinetheassociatedmethodologyaswellasverifysomeofthereportedtechniquesforcarryingout
radiofrequencyreplayattacksusinglowcostmaterialsandfreelyavailablesoftware.
Keywords
Radio frequency (RF) communications, replay attack methodology, visual signal analysis, protocol
analysis,RFsignaldecoding,RfCat,subGHzRFspectrum,softwaredefinedradio(SDR)

INTRODUCTION
Radiotrafficissaidtoberarelyusedinpenetrationtestingduringthereconnaissancephase,yetone
is able to collect potentially valuable information through its capture and analysis (Neely,
Hamerstone, & Sanyk, 2013). The modern equipment that is needed to facilitate the protocol
analysis,aswellassubsequentsignalretransmission,doesnothavetobecostlyorunwieldy.

Withtheproliferationofsoftwaredefinedradios(SDRs),whichmaybepurchasedforlessthan$20
USD, interested radio amateurs as well as researchers with limited funding are able to explore the
field of radio communications (Smith, 2012). While SDRs are theoretically able to operate on
frequencies between 55MHz and 2300MHz, with some specialised devices designed by Ossmann
(2013) being able to cover the extended 30MHz6000MHz range, this study focuses on the
frequenciesbelow1000MHz,orthe"subGHz"range.ThesubGHzrangeisofimmenseinterestdue
tothehighnumberandvarietyofdevicesthatoperatewithinthatrange.Theaimofthestudyisto
verifyprimitivevisualsignalanalysistechniquesthatcouldpotentiallybeusefulinexecutingreplay
attacks against devices in the subGHz range without the need to acquire detailed knowledge of
radiocommunicationsorexpensiveequipment.

DEVICESINTHESUBGHZSPECTRUM
Devices that operate in the subGHz range commonly include alarm systems, various meters and
sensors(suchas proximity,pressure,andacceleration),homeautomationsystems,remote camera
flashes and shutter triggers, garage door openers (GDE), remote keyless entry systems (RKE), tyre
pressure monitoring systems (TPMS), wireless door chimes, smartgrid technology components for
metertoutilitycommunications,cordlessphones,mobilephones,medicaldevicesaswellasradio
frequency identification (RFID) devices (Atlas, 2012b; Harizanov, 2012; Liang & Liu, 2011; Sikken,
2009;SiliconLabs,2010;Smith,2012;Weber,2013).

AccordingtoLiangandLiu(2011)andSiliconLabs(2010),subGHzfrequenciestendtobetherational
choice for such devices because utilising this portion of the spectrum facilitates the following
features:

x Range
x Lowinterference
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x

Lowpowerconsumption


While it is also not unusual for the device designers to turn to the 2.4GHz band to achieve global
interoperabilitythroughtheutilisationofcommonstandardssuchasBluetooth,WLANandZigBee,
devices that require prolonged batterybased operation are often designed to function in the sub
GHzbands.

Table1.SomeCommonRegionalSubGhzBands(Harney&O’Mahony,2006)



MostofthebandspresentedinTable1arealsocommonlyknownastheindustrialscientificmedical
(ISM)bands(Frenzel,2010).Specifically,the433MHzbandisoftenthepopularchoiceoftheglobal
manufacturers, as it only requires a minor frequency adjustment to operate in Japan (Harney &
O’Mahony, 2006). It should be noted that in Australia such devices are also referred to as the low
interference potential devices (LIPDs), and their operation in the 433.05434.79MHz band is
supported through the relevant class licence as long as the maximum equivalent isotropically
radiatedpower(EIRP)doesnotexceed25milliwatt(mW).Historically,theadoptionofthe433MHz
band in Australia was driven in the late 1990s by the growing demand for the importation and
adoption of the devices from Europe, where, unlike in Australia, the 433MHz band is also the
designatedISMband(ACMA,1999).

ATTACKMETHODOLOGY
Atthetimeofwriting,anumberofarticlesandblogentriesthatdescribetheapproachestakento
capture and reverseengineer radio frequency (RF) signals are available on the Internet (Hohawk,
2012;Laurie,2013;Weber,2013).Unfortunately,theresearcherhasnotbeensuccessfulinlocating
publishedpeerreviewedarticlesspecifictothistopicinthecontextofdevicescommonlyfoundin
residentialproperties,apartfromtheonesthatemploytheKeeLoqblockcipher(Aertsetal.,2012).
Perhaps,thiscouldbeduetopoorkeywordselection,orotherwisegoestoaccentuatetheperceived
noveltyofusinglowcostmaterialstocarryoutRFreplayattacksonconsumerelectronics.

Inthecontextofthisstudy,theactivitiesassociatedwiththecapture,decodingandretransmission
oftheRFsignalsarereferredtoas"attacks",becausesuccessfulsignaldecodingandretransmission
areexpectedtoresultintakingpartialor,insomecases,fullcontrolofthetargetdevicecontraryto
thedesireofitsownerortheintentionofthemanufacturer.Basedonthecurrentlyavailablereports,
itispossibletoderiveastructuredtheoreticalmethodologyforcarryingouttheseattacks.
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Figure1.RFReplayAttackMethodology


Figure 1 represents the stages typically involved when attempting to carry out RF replay attacks.
Essentially, the process commences with the selection of the target device. In a modern domestic
setting, wireless door chimes, GDEs and RKEs are typically available and present a number of
opportunitiesaspotentialtargets.

Once thetargetisidentified, theprotocolanalysis phasebegins. This phaseseemstobe the most
complexpartoftheprocessasitconsistsofmultiplestepsandoftenrequirestherepetitionofsome
of the steps to achieve a successful outcome, which in this context means being able to reliably
decodeandretransmitthecapturedsignalsothatthetargetreactstoit.

The first step of this phase is concerned with the identification of the operating frequency of the
selected device. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission Identification (FCC
ID)labelattachedtothedeviceitselfmaybeusedtolookuptheoperatingfrequencyofthedevice
online(Weber,2013).IntheUnitedKingdom,theRadio&TelecommunicationsTerminalEquipment
(R&TTE) approval label is claimed to provide the ability to determine the frequency in a similar
fashion(Laurie,2013).Additionally,theinformationcontainedinvariousrelevantpatentsmayalso
beusedtoidentifythefrequencyandeventhespecificationofthecommunicationprotocolinsome
cases(Atlas,2012b).Finally,theidentificationoftheoperatingfrequencymaybeachievedthrougha
more tedious process of systematically scanning the spectrum for radio signals while ensuring an
activetransmissionfromthedeviceinparallel.Variousopensourcecommandlinetoolsaswellas
SDRgraphicaluserinterface(GUI)frontendsarereadilyavailabletoassistandpotentiallyautomate
thistask.


Figure2.HDSDR(left)andGqrx(right)SDRGUIFrontends


The next step is to demodulate the raw signal and capture it into one of the common audio file
formats,suchasaWAVfile.TherecordingofthesignalmaybeperformedusinganSDRGUIsuchas
HDSDRorGqrx(Figure2)andalsoviathemeansofacustomGNURadioprocessingchain(Hohawk,
2012; Laurie, 2013). It should be noted that, while other methods potentially exist to achieve the
sameoutcome,thisapproachisbeingdescribedbecauseitdoesnotrequiredeepunderstandingof
RFbased communications. Also, the description of the various modulation schemes and the
associatedconceptsisoutsidethescopeofthisresearch.ThecaptureusuallyinvolvestuninganSDR
tothedesignatedoperatingfrequencyofthetargetdevice,usingAmplitudeModulation(AM)asthe
demodulationscheme,sinceitisclaimedtobethemostlikelyused,andinitiatingthetransmission
fromthedevicewhilerecordingatthesametime.
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Figure3.CapturedSignalWave(top),SquareSignalWave(middle),DecodedBinaryValuePortion(bottom)(Laurie,2013)



Oncethesignalhasbeencaptured,decodingissuggestedtobecarriedoutviathemeansofvisual
waveform analysis and decomposition. Essentially, the successful decoding relies on the ability to
match the waveform peaks to respective data bits. Knowing the signal modulation scheme is
requiredtoconvertthesignalintobinaryform.Essentially,AmplitudeShiftKeying(ASK)andOnOff
Keying(OOK)modulationschemes,thelatterbeingasimplificationofASK,aregenerallyclaimedto
bethemostlikelyschemesusedduetolowimplementationcostandlongbatterylife(Brown,Bagci,
King,&Roedig,2013;Holenarsipur,2009).InthecaseofOOK,energysavingisachievedbecausethe
transmitter does not spend power when sending 0 or 1 bits depending on the specifics of the
implementation pertinent to a particular device. Interestingly, previous research suggests that
without having access to the specification of the communication protocol, it is not feasible to
determine in advance whether a wave peak represents a 0 bit or a 1 bit and vice versa (Hohawk,
2012).Consequently,decodingislikelytoturnintoaniterativeprocesswiththeoutcomeverification
performedviasignalretransmission.

Tofacilitateabettervisualbasisfortheanalysis,thecapturedsignalmayalsobeconvertedtosquare
wave through the process of amplification. Figure 3 shows the visual differences between the
originally captured wave and the resulting amplified square wave. Furthermore, the figure also
represents the visual conversion process that is based on assuming the modulation protocol being
OOK. In this case, the "highs" are assumed to represent the 1 bits and the "lows" the 0 bits
respectively. The bit length also corresponds to the length of the shortest pulse. It should also be
noted that it is common for the repeated bursts padded with whitespace to be transmitted as
opposedtosinglesignalinstances.Thefinalcrucialcomponentistheabilitytodeterminethesignal
datarateorbaudrate(Atlas,2012b).Inthecontextofvisualanalysis,measuringthelengthofthe
shortestpulseinaburstanddividing1bythemeasuredlengthinsecondsmaybeusedtocalculate
the data rate (Hohawk, 2012). Given that this study is only concerned with primitive techniques,
othermodulationschemes,suchasfrequencyshiftkeying(FSK),areconsideredtobeoutofscope.
Analogically, sync words, modes and programmatic data (baud) rate detection are also not being
described.

Havingconvertedthesignalintobinaryformprovidesthebasisforsubsequentreplay.Itissuggested
that a tool called RfCat is well suited for this purpose, as it provides an easily accessible Python
basedpromptforcarryingoutvariousRFrelatedresearchtasksinteractively(Hohawk,2012;Laurie,
2013;Weber,2013).Thetoolisdescribedinmoredetailinthenextsection.Forthepurposeofsignal
transmission,thebinaryformneedstobeconvertedtohexadecimalformsupportedbyPython.For
example,thevalueof01011100,whichcorrespondsto5C,maybepassedtotheinteractiveshellas
“\x5C”.ProvidedthatacompatibledongleisavailableandtheRfCatfirmwarehasbeenloadedonto
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it,replayingthesignalisamatterofusingtheinteractiveshellto:

1. Tunetotherequiredoperatingfrequency
2. Setthemodulationscheme
3. Setthedatarate
4. Transmitthestringderivedfromthebinaryrepresentation
5. Observethereactionofthetargetdevice

Ifthereplayissuccessful,thedeviceisexpectedtorespondtothesignal.Forinstance,inthecaseof
awirelessdoorchime,oneshouldhearthebellring.Inthecaseofagaragedooropener,thedoor
shouldopenorclosedependingonitspreviousstate.Assuggested,itisnotgrantedthatasuccessful
replay will occur on the first attempt, at which point steps 3 to 6 will need to be repeated until a
successfulreplaytakesplace.Finally,toeasethesubsequentreplays,onemaychoosetoautomate
the steps required to configure the dongle and send the signal by writing a custom Python script.
Interestingly, the eZ430Chronos wireless development kit may also be used to carry out the
transmission and there is an opensource tool available that aids with programming the watch
(Laurie,2013).

Using the process based on the methodology described above, a number of security researchers
havebeensuccessfulincarryingoutreplayattacksagainstawirelessdoorchime,remotegateand
garage door opener, automotive remote car entry systems and a wireless power saver adaptor
(Hohawk, 2012; Laurie, 2013). In the latter case, the consequences could be as dire as setting a
residentialpropertyonfire,whichwouldbelikelytoresultinextensivepropertydamage,injuryor
death (Tung, 2013). Subsequent comments left on the blog entry pages also indicate that ongoing
researchintocommunicationprotocolsemployedbywirelessalarmsystemshavebeentakingplace.

RFCAT
TheopensourceprojectthatfacilitatesRFbasedsecurityresearchcalledRfCatisdubbedthe"the
Swiss army knife of subGHz radio" (Atlas, 2012a). The project has undergone a phase of active
developmentbymultiplecontributorsoverthelasttwoyearswiththelastchangecommittedinMay
2013 at the time of writing. Officially, only the following three devices currently support the RfCat
firmware:

x RadicaIMMewirelesshandhelddevice
x TexasInstrumentsCC1111USBevaluationmodulekit
x Texas Instruments eZ430Chronos wireless development kit (specifically, the CC1111based
USBaccesspoint)

In addition, a custom electronic badge has been specifically designed and built to support RfCat
(Ossmann,2012).Whiletheprojectdocumentationcontainsadetailedsetofinstructionsonloading
thefirmwareontothesupporteddevice,theinteractiveshellissparselydocumentedandsuccessful
application of the tool in practice is said to require a sufficient level of understanding of radio
communications(Weber,2013).
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Figure4.RfCatInteractiveShellWelcomeMessage


Figure 4 presents the screenshot of the interactive RfCat shell that is shown immediately upon its
launch. The shell provides a global object "d", which facilitates the necessary interface to the USB
dongle.Basedonthebriefexaminationofthesourcecode,theinbuilthelpandthepresentationby
theoriginalauthor,anumberofkeymethodsusefulinthecontextofthestudyhavebeenidentified.

Table2.RfCatMethodsFoundUsefulintheContextoftheStudy

Method

Description

help(d)

Displaystheinbuilthelpavailableforallsupportedcommands

help(d.[METHOD])

Displays the inbuilt help for the specified method, where [METHOD] should be
replacedbynameofthedesiredmethod

d.printRadioConfig

Printsthecurrentdetailedconfigurationofthedongle

d.setFreq

Setstheoperatingfrequency

d.setMdmModulation

Setsthemodulationscheme(suchasOOK)

d.setMdmDRate

Setstheoperatingdata(baud)rate

d.makePktFLEN

Setsthelengthofthetransmittedorreceivedpackettoanarbitraryvalue

d.RFxmit

Transmitsthesignalcorrespondingtothesupplieddatavalue

d.RFlisten

Putsthedongleintomonitoringmodethatdisplayspacketsastheyarrive

d.specan

Opensthespectrumanalyserwindow


Table2onlylistsasmallsubsetofthemethodsavailable,additionalmethodsthatsupportlowlevel
signaldiscoverymodes,aswellasautomatedfrequencyscanningroutinesarealsoreadilyavailable.
RfCatappearstobeaversatiletoolthathasanumberofpotentialapplicationstoRFbasedsubGHz
securityresearch.Thepresentedabilitytolistentoradiotrafficinrealtimeandhavethedecoded
datapresentedonscreeninstringformcouldpotentiallyeliminatetheneedforthetediousvisual
protocol decomposition process and speed up the signal decoding phase by multiple orders of
magnitude.Ultimately,theintentionbehindthetoolwastoimplementameansofconvenientaccess
tothesubGHzspectrum,sothatsecurityconcernsassociatedwithradiocommunicationsprotocols
employed by respective devices could be verified, justified and subsequently mitigated through
informeddeviceandprotocoldesignimprovements.
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VERIFICATION
AimsandAssumptions
To verify the reported signal decoding and retransmission techniques in practice, the author has
acquiredthenecessaryequipmentandselectedatargetdevicetoachievethefollowingaims:

1. CapturethesignalusinganSDR
2. Decodethecapturedsignalusingvisualwaveformanalysismethod
3. Verifytheaccuracyoftheresultingdecodedsignalviathemeansofasuccessfulreplay
4. Identifyotherpotentialwaysofachievingthesameoutcome

Thedescribedverificationprocessisbasedontheassumptionthathavingadetailedunderstanding
ofradiocommunicationsisnotrequiredtobeabletoachieveasuccessfuloutcome.Furthermore,
theauthordidnotpossessanyofsuchknowledgepriortocarryingoutthisresearch.

Materials
Inordertofollowthepreviouslydescribedmethodology,thefollowingmaterialswereobtained:

x TerratecTStickDVBTUSBStick(E4000)withmetalantennaandantennamount
x TexasInstrumentseZ430Chronoswirelessdevelopmentkit
x TexasInstrumentsCCDebugger
x Genericsolderingkitandsolderwire
x Acommoditylaptopcomputerwithx2USBports,GqrxandAudacityinstalled

BecausetheeZ430ChronosUSBaccesspointbasedontheCC1111systemonchipdoesnotcome
with development header pins, debug interface connection to the CCDebugger needs to be
facilitatedviathemeansofsoldering.
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Figure5.eZ430ChronosRFAccessPointConnectiontoCCDebuggerSolderingSpecification(top),theResultingSuccessful
DebuggingInterface(bottom)(TI,2013)


Figure5representsthesolderingschematicappropriatefortheUSBdongleusedinthisstudy(top),
aswellastheresultinginterfacecableconnectedtotheCCDebuggerwiththegreenLEDindicatinga
successfulconnection(bottom).Oncethedebugginginterfaceisfunctioning,thecustomRfCatboot
loaderfirmwareneedstobeloadedontotheaccesspointusingtheTexasInstrumentsSmartRFFlash
Programmersoftware.Havingsatisfiedthenecessaryprerequisites,thecustomRfCatfirmwaremay
beloadedontothedonglebyfollowingtheinstructionssuppliedwiththetool.Subsequentcapture
and protocol analysis described in the next sections were carried out in an isolated laboratory
setting.

FollowingtheMethodology
Alocallymanufacturedwirelessdoorchimewasacquiredforthepurposeofthisstudy.Thistarget
wasassumedtoyieldahigherpotentialofsuccessfulreplaycomparedtodevicesthatareknownto
employ sophisticated security mechanisms, such as RKEs (Aerts et al., 2012). The operating
frequencyofthedevicewasinitiallydiscoveredbyvisuallyinspectingthechimecomponentcase,as
itwasconvenientlyprovidedontheattachedlabel.Subsequently,tuningtheSDRtothediscovered
value and testing for signal presence while pushing the button on the remote verified the found
operatingfrequency,whichinthiscasewas433.92MHz.



Figure6.CapturedSignalWave(top),SquareSignalWave(middle),DecodedBinaryandHexValues(bottom)


Analogouslytothepreviousreports,themodulationschemeemployedbythedevicewasassumed
to be AM. At that stage, the frequency value and modulation scheme provided sufficient basis for
signal capture. Once the signal was captured, it was established that the demodulated waveform
comprisedofabout60shortbursts,allofwhichwereidentical.Atthispoint,duetothesimplicityof
the originally captured waveform the signal decoding could also be done without the need for
conversiontosquarewave.Nevertheless,conversionwasperformedforsubsequentdemonstration
purposes.Figure6representsthecapturedsignalinitsoriginalform,aswellastheresultingsquare
waveandthedecodedbinaryandhexadecimalvalues.Thedecodingassumesthattheshortestpeak
represents the 1 bit. Measuring the length of the shortest peak in seconds and dividing 1 by the
measuredvalueprovidedthedatarateof2500bitspersecond.

Theinitialreplaywasnotsuccessfulbecausethewhitespacebetweentheburstsdidnotmatchthat
expected by the device. The length of the required whitespace was determined in an iterative
manner to be 3 NULL bytes. Finally, sending the decoded binary value of “\x12\xD9\x65\x96\xD9”
(payload) immediately followed by “\x00\x00\x00” (whitespace) 60 times resulted in a successful
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replayasthetargetrespondedtothesignal.Later,itwasalsodeterminedthatsendingaslittleas18
bursts also resulted in a successful replay. While subsequent automation was out of scope of the
study, one could potentially create a script to brute force the associated signal key space to
determine how quickly a successful replay may be achieved automatically after a code change or
usinganothertargetofasimilarkind.

CONCLUSION
Buildinguponthepreviousresearch,thestudyhaspresentedabasicRFreplayattackmethodology
based on visual signal analysis. In the context of simple devices that utilise the OOK modulation
scheme,thepresentedmethodologyhasbeenverifiedtobesuccessfulandprovesthatcarryingout
simpleRFreplayattacksdoesnotrequiresubstantialknowledgeofradiocommunications.Thestudy
has shown that a lowcost SDR coupled with a USB dongle compatible with the RfCat firmware
provide a solid foundation for carrying out RF signal analysis and retransmission tasks. Ultimately,
thisemphasisesthelowlevelofskillandfundsrequiredtocarryoutRFattacksagainstotherdevices
andtheassociatedsecuritychallenges.

Thestudyhighlightsanumberofopportunitiesforfutureresearch.Firstly,otherdevicesandmore
complex communication protocols could be analysed in greater detail to derive additional and
potentiallymoreefficientdecodingtechniques.Forexample,conversionofwavepulsesintobinary
and hexadecimal representations could be automated using a custom script. Secondly, RF signals
could potentially be used in locational fingerprinting. Thirdly, the features of RfCat that facilitate
automatedsignaldiscoveryanddecodingwithouttheneedforvisualwaveforminspectioncouldbe
studied in more detail. Finally and most importantly, research into ways of securing weak radio
communicationprotocolscouldassistwithprotectingthesubGHzspectrumfrompotentialattacks
inthefuture.
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